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'Phis paper develops ~t new theoretical model wíth which to examine the interaction between technology and organizations. Early rese~irch sWclics assumed technology to be an objective, external force that would have deterministic impacts on organizational {properties such as structure. Later researchers focused on the human aspect of technology, seeing it as the outcome of strategic choice and social aeticm. This p,►per suggests that either view is incomplete, and proposes a reconceptualization cif technc~l~gy that takes both perspectives into account. A theoretical model-the structurational meidel of technology-is built vn the basis af this ncw conceptualizutiun, and its workings explored through discussion of a field study of information technology. The paper suggests that the reformul<Uion n( the technology concept and the structurationul model of technology allow a deeper and more dialectical understanding cif the interaction hetween technology and organizations. This understanding provides intiight into the limits and opportunities of human choice, technology development and use, and organizaticma) design. Implications Far Foturc research of the new concept of technology and the structurational model of technology are discussul.
(ORGANIZATIONS; STRUCTURATION THEORY; S'TKUC~URATIONAL MQDEL OF TECHNOLOGY; TECHNOLOGY)
Technology has always been a central variable in organizational theory, informing research and practice. Despite years of investigative effort there is little agrc;ement on the definition and measurement of technology, and no compelling evidence on the precise role of technology in organizational aí~airs. I will argue that the divergent definitions and opposing perspectives associated with tech~~ologic~l research have limited our understanding of how technology interacts with organizations, and that these incompatibilities cannot he resolved by mutual concession. What is needed is a reconstruction of the concept of technology, which fundamentally re-examines sur current nations of technology and its role in organizations.
In this paper, I undertake such a reconsh•uction and present a view of technology that draws on Giddens' (1076 Giddens' ( , 1979 Giddens' ( , 1984 theory of structuration. My re-examination leads to a model for analyzing the nature ~inc3 rile of technology in organizations, wl~ieh I term the sti•ueturational model c7f tcchnolo~ry. Before proceeding to the premises and components of this model, prior views af technology are reviewed tcs erve as background and motivation for the alternative pro~oscd here.
Rethinking Prior t:onccE~tualirations of T'echuology
Prior conceptualizations of' techn~l~gy have each fUrused selectively nn some aspects of technology, at the expense of others, with the result that the current state of knowledge about technology in organizations is ambiguous and c~nFlicting (Attewell and Rule_ Iá)84 ; Barley 1990 ; Uavis ~lnd Taylor l~)Sb; Hsu•tmtu~n et al. lá)86; Scott 1981) . Two important aspects of the technology concept are scope-what is defined as comprising kechnology, and role-how is the interaction between technology and organizations defined. Beth these aspects infann prier technological research, where they have been specified and used discrepantly. Two views on the scope of technology have pervaded (aid shaped) studies of technology, reflecting the different claims to generalizability that researchers have intended with their work. The one set of studies has focused on technology as "hardware," that is, the equipment, machines, and 111SfI'ULI1CL1lS ~Ildi IlUfI1Si15 USC in productive activities, whether industrial or informational devices (Barley 196; Blau et al. 1976; Bj~irn-Andersen, Eason and Robey 198fí; Davis 1989; Hickson et al. 1969; Lucas 1975; Noble 1984; Robey 1981; Shaiken 1985; Woodward 1958; Zuboff 198) . The range of hardware across industries and organizations, however, has led to multiple, context-specific definitions of technolo~ry, which have inhibited comparisons across studies and settings. For example, Woodward's (1958) categorization of technology as industrial production techniques is limited to manufacturing firms. Alternatively, this approach has also resulted in the use of broad definitions of technology which, having to accommodate a wide range of machinery, become so abstract as tch ave limned discriminatory or informational value. Tor example, Blau et al. 's (1976) definition of technology, deployed in the f~ctnry and the o(iice, is given as "the substitution of equipment fpr human labor" (1976, p. 21) .
In the "hardware" view, technology is a meaningful variable c7nly in those organizations that employ machinery in their productive activities. 'This restriction prompted researchers to try and generalize the scope of the technology variable so as to encompass organizations such as service firms and educational institutions. The technology concept was thus extended tv "social technologies," thereby indttding the generic tasks, techniques, and knowledge utilized when humans engage in any productive activities (Eveland 198(; Perrow 1967; Thompson 1967) . Far example, Perrow (1967) sees organizations as places where raw materials are transformed, thus defining what is done to raw materials and how it is done, as the technology of organizations, while Thompson (1967) characterizes the work How of different organizations in terms of long-linked, mediating, and intensive technologies.
While useful, in that it allows technology to be a meaningful variable in all organizations, and it recognizes that there is more to technology than just the hardware, this generic approach ta technology creates bcaundary and measurement ambiguity (Mintzberg 1979, p. 25(1) . It also overlocks valuable ini'orm~tion about the mediation of human action by ma~hincs. That is, even as wc gain in generality, wc have lost the ability tv ask questions about how artifacts interact with human agents. I3y aggregating task, technique, knowledge, and tools into a single construct-technology-interaction among these constituting components and with humans is ign~re~l. For example, we cannot examine how different assumptions, knowledge, and techniques can he e«ihedded in difl'erent kinds of artifacts car practices, and how these will have di8'erential consequences for human action and cogniticm. Nor cpn we examine how the rules and procedures structured into a machine are differentially appropriated, changed, or ignored by the agents executing work (Perrt~w 1983; Buchman and Wynn 1984; Wynne 1988 ).
Drfferc»ceS li! ROIL'
Three streams of technology research can be distinguished by their definitions of the role played by technology in organizations, 1'ERCCllilg 1~1C ~) III~OSOpI11C~íI (7ppOSÍlÍO❑ between subjective and objective realms that has dominated the social sciences (Bernstein 1978; Burrell and Morgan 1979; Giddens 1 ~7y) . The early work assumed technology to be an objective, external force that would have (relatively) deterministic impacts nn organizational properties such as structure. In contrast, a later group of researchers focused on the human action aspeel of technology, seeing; it more as ~ Organizational Dimensions Technology F►cuae: 1. Technologic:il Imperative ~9odel.
product of shared interpretations oi• interventions. Thy third, and more recent, work an technology has rcvertec) to a "sift" determinism where technology is posited as an external force having impacts, but where fÍ1C5~ impacts are moderated by human actors ~tnd organizational contexts.
T/re "Tecluiolvgica! /n~Per~r~tive" Mode% In this body of work, studies of technology (Aldrich 1972; Blau et al. 1976; Hickson et al. 1969; Ferr~w 1967; Shepard 1977; Woodward 1958] and information technology Garter 1984; Davis 1989; Foster and Flynn 1984; Hiltz ~►nd Johnson lyy0; Leavitt and Whistler 1958; Pfeffer and Leblcbici 1977; Siegel et al. 19$6) examine the impacts of technology on organizational dimensions such as structure, size, performance, and centralization/dece ntralizakion, as well as individual level dimensions such as job satisfaction, task complexity, skill levels, communication effectiveness, and productivity. The premise is th~it tl~e technology as well as the organizational and individual variables can be measured and predicted (see Figure 1) , Such research treats technology 1s an independent influence cpn human behavior vr organizational properties, that exerts unidirectional, clusal influences over humans and organizations, similar to those operating in nature (Giddens 1984, p. 2(l7) . Somẽ f this research allows for the influznce of technology to be moderated by contextual variables, proposing ~~ contingency model t~ [ technology's efl~ects (e.g, Ja~venp~ia 1989; Lucas 197.5) . While providing insight into the often determining aspects of technology, this body of research largely ignores the action of' humans in developing, appropriating, <ind changing technolo~ry. As a consequence, this perspective furnishes an incomplete account of technology and its interaction with organizaiians, Tfrc~ "Strategic Clrc~ice" Mode/. This perspective ~uggesls that technology is not an external r~bjecl, but a product. of c~ngc~ing human action, design, and appropriation. Three i'ese3rch foci within this perspective are discernable. O~ie stream focuses vn how a particular technology is physically constructed through tl~e social interactions and po(ikical choices cif human actors. 'I"cchnology is here understood lo be a dependent va~•iable, contingent on ether Forces in the ~rganizr~tion, most notably powerful human actors (see Figure 2 ). This perspective does nat. accept that technolc~gy is given oi• immul~►ble, focusing attention instead on the manner in which techn~lo~y is influenced by the context and strategies of technology decision makers and users (Child 1972; Davis and "I'ayIOI' I~HC) ; Kling and lac~no 1984; Markus 19 33; Perrow 1983; Trist et al. 1963 ; Zubotf 1~)H8).
Particularly relevant here are socio-technical studies, which are premised on the belief that outcomes such as joh satisfaction and productivifiy of workers can be manipulated by jointly "optinuzing" the social turd technical factrn~s of jobs (Davis and 'Taylor the work of Zubof~ (1988) , which calls for a re-examination and restructuring of organizations around the potential ~f information technology. Zuboff suggests that because information technology can be designed with different intentions (tc~ "autuiilate" or "informate" vork), it will have different implications for workers (controlling and deskilling or empowering and upskilling, respectively).
These analyses, however, rely ton heavily vn the capability of human agc,nts. The presumption is made that once technology i~ designed to embody the "a~prapriate" (optimizing or informating) objectives and once managers are committed to this "appropriate" strategy, more rewarding workplaces, more Huid organizations, a new division of labor, and better performance will result. But, as many of the case studies in Zuhoff (1~)8$) reveal, how a technology is deployed and appropriated depends on social and economic forces beyond managerial intent (Powell 1987; Sabel 1982; Sltaiken 1985) , which may thwart any intended reconstruction of jobs and technology. Some of these forces include institutional properties af the organization, micropolitics of the workplace, features of the environment, and unintended consequences of organizational change. Such forces may account fc~r the mixed success that socio-technical interventions have had in a range of organizations (Kelly 1978; Pasmore et al. l 9$2 The final research stream in this tradition is reUresenled by Marxist accounts of technology such as those of Braverman (1974 Braverman ( ), ~oc~ley (1980 , Edv~~ards (1979) , Noble (1984), and Perrone (1986) . While carefully outlining the manner in which technal~gy is devised and deployed ro further the political ~►nd economic interesks of powerful actors (the social construction of technology at the point ot' initiation), these studies clo n~i adequately deal with human agency in the work~~lace (the social construction of technology at the point of use). They c~n5equently fail to account for the diverse ways in which a technology is appropriated and utilized by workers, and the nonunifarm manner in which it structures individual and organizational action (Burawoy 1979; Powell 1)~7). Tiie limitation here is the selectivity with which the notion of Barley (1986 Barley ( , 1990 , and involves portraying technolo~ry as an intervention into the relationship between human agents and organizational structure, which potentially changes it (se.e Figure   3 ). Barley (19 6) employed a longitudinal field study tv examine the introduction oí' similar radiographic technology into difiTerent organizafions. Within each c~rga~liza-tic~n, he found that the technology triggered a change in departmental structure by altering instih~ticmalized roles and patterns of interaction. I3y compaa•in~ two ~rgani-zations and determining that they responded differently to the implcmcniation of a similar technology, Barley (1X86, p. 107) effectively demonstrated that: "Technologies do intluence organizational structures in orcíel~ly ways, but their inNuence depends vn the specific historical process in which they are em~eddcd."
Within his frame of reference Barley posits a role for technology, not as material cause, but as a material trigger, occasioning certain social dynamics that lead to anticipated and unanticipated structw-ing consequences (such as increased decentralization in his study). Technc7logy is understood as a social object whose meaning is defined by the context of use, while its physical form and function remain fixed across time and contexts of use. While Barley asserts that some features of the technology arc socially constructed, he does not ~ill~w fc~r the physical modification of technology during use. Given a technology such as CT scanners-with relatively fixed and standardized functions and features-such a view may be appropriate. lc is, however, not generally ~ippropriate, and is particul~u~ly ïnadequate in the case of information technologies. While technologies may appear to have objective forms and functions at one point, these can and do vary try dií~crent users, by different contexts of use, and by the same users over time.
IZet~ie►~~in~,f Jhe~ Ïechrrolo~~ Lileraliu•e
The above discussion has been a brief and somewhat critical examination of extant research into the scope and role of technology in organizations. This examination is not original, as recent discussions in the organizational literature have similarly critiqued this work (Attewel! and Rule 1984; llavis and Taylor 198b; Hodson and Parker 1988; M~lrkus and Robey 1988; Perrow 1983; Powell 1987; Sabel 1982) . }-lowever, while researchers have concentrated on deconstruction tv identify the limitations imposed by overly cictcrministic vr iincluly voluntaristic perspectives, they have not engaged in the equally important task of reconstruction. What is still lacking is a new conceptualization of technology and its relationship with organizations that will allow us tc~ move beyond critique ta an altern~itive conceptual basis from which to conduct future research.
In this paper, 1 employ the tenets of structurati~n theory tv reconstruct the concept cif technology and to propose a model for investigating the relatiat~ship between technology and organizations. In defining my concept of technology, I restrict its scope to material artifacts (various configurations of hardware and software). 1 wish to sustain adistinction-at least theoretically-between the material nature cif technc~l-ogy and the human activities that design ~r use those artifacts, This definition is consistent with the view that overloading the technology ~ane~pt is unnecessarily Illllltlllg, but it should not lie understood as an exclusive focus nn technology as a physical object. In contrast, the analytic decoupling of artifacts from human action allows me to conceptualize material artifacts as the outcome af coordinated human action and hence as inherently social. It also facilitates my framing of the role of technology in terms of a mutual interaction between human agents and technology, and hence as both structw~al and socially construcked.
My proposal for a strucluration~~l model of technology makes nv claims as to completeness vr perfection, and is presented as another in the stream of thinking about the technology phenomenon. It toi, inevitably, is limited by its author's beliefs and interestti. 1 submit however, th~it the reconceptualization, while bounded, overcomes certain dualisms and abstractions that have inhered in prior perspectives, and sensitizes us tv the dialectical interplay of technology and organizations.
A Structurational Model of Technology
Recent work in social theory (Giddens 1976, 19 4) and philosophy af science (Bernstein 1978; Bhaskar 1979) has challenged the long-standing opposition in the social sciences between subjective and objective dimensions of social reality, eind proposes an alternative meta-theory which incorporalcs both dimensions. Gicldens' theory of structuration (1979, l9á4 ) is one such alternative, and a number of organizational researchers have adopted and used the theory in their analyses of organizational processes (I3~r1ey 1 y86 ; Manning 1982; Pettigrew 195; Ranson, Hiníngs and Greenwood 1980; Riley 1983; Roberts and Sclpens 1985; Smith 1983; Spybcy 1984; Willmott 197) . For these researchers, structuration offers a solution to the dilemma of choosing between subjective and objective conceptions of organizations, and allows them to embrace bcsth• (Dow 19~3b; Poole and Van de Ven 1X89; Willmott 1981) ,
The Theory of Shctctt~ration Structuration is posited as a social 'process that involves the reciprocal interaction of human actors and structural features of organizations. The theory of structuration recognizes chat human actions are enabled and constrained by structures, yet that these structures are the result of previous actions, In Gidslens' framework, structure is understood paradigmatically, that is, as a generic concept that is only manifested in the structural properties of social Systems (Giddens 1979, pp. 64-(~5) . Struchiral properties consist of the rules ar~d resources that human agents use in their everyday interaction. These rules and resources mediate human action, while al the same time they are reaffirmed through being used by human actors.
In this theory, the role of human actors in rcatTirming structural properties is highlighted so as to avoid reification. The recognition that actors arc knowledgeable and reflexive is a central premise. Giddens notes (1934, p. 22) : "All social actors, all human beings arc highly `learned' in respect of knowledge which they possess and apply, in the production and reproduction of day-to-day social encounters." Giddens distinguishes between discw•sive and practical knowledge, where the former refers to knowledge the actors are able to articulate (what is said), and the latter refers tc~ tacit knowledge, which actors are able tv draw on in action but are unable tv express (what is simply done). Reflexivity refers to the capacity of humans tv routinely observe and understand what they arc doing whits they arc doing it. It is not merely self-consciousness, but includes the continuous monitoring of physical and social contexts, and activities (their own and Uthers) (Giddens 19~i4, p. 5) . Actors' knowledge and reflexivity, however, is always bounded to some extent by the situated nature of action, the difficulty of articulating tacit knowledge, unconscious sources of motivation, aast unintended consequences of action (Giddens 1979, p. 144) .
Through the regular action of knowledgeable and reflexive actors, patterns of interactions become established as standardized practices in organizations, c.g., ways of manufacturing a product, coordinating a meeting, or evaluating an employee. Over time, habitual use of such practices eventually becomes institutionalized, forming the structural properties of organizations. These structural vr institutionalized properties (structure) are drawn on by humans in their ongoing interactions (agency), even as such use, in turn, reinforces the institutionalized properties. In this formulationknown as the duc~/it~~ of sn•uc~crrc~-Gidde.ns overcomes the dualism between objeetive, structural features of organizations and subjective, knowledgeable ~~ction of human agents.
When humans act in organizations, they create and recreate three fundamental elements af social interaction (Giddens 1976, p. 104) : me~~ning, power, and norms. While these elements are highly interdependent and not separable in practice, í'or uialytical purposes w~ can treat them as distinct, examining each from the perspective of human agency and in5titutionalizeci properties.
-From an agency point of view, human interaction involves the constitution and communication of r~ieurii~tg. This is achieved via interpretive schemes or' stocks of knowledge that humans draw on in their ongoing interaction with the world, which " ... t'orm the core ~f mutual knowledge whereby an accountable universe of meaning is sustained through and in processes of interaction" (Giddc;ns 1979, p. 83). The interpretive schemes, however, do m~~rc than merely enable shared meanings end hence mediate communication. From the perspective of institutionalized propertics, interpretive schemes represent organizational ,sh•c~cleu~es of signification, which represent the organizatic~n~tl rules that inform and define interaction. Interpretive schemes ~l1't; also reinforced or changed through social interaction, as the org~iniza-lional rules are reaffirmed or challenged through their use by human agents, ' ('hu5 , in any interaction, shared knowledge is not merely part of the background, but is an integral part of the social encounter, in part organizing it, and in part being shaped by the interaction ikself.
-From an agency perspective, poteer enters into human interaction through providing organizational capabilities for humans t~ accomplish outcomes. Power is here understood as "transformative capacity," the power of human action to transform chc social and material world (Roberts and Sc~pens 19K5, p. 449) . Its use iñ rganízati~ns is medí~ited via the organizational resources that participants bring to, and mobilize within, interaction (Giddens 197y, . Two kinds of resources are reeognize.d, authoritative (extending over persons) and allocative (extending over objects vr material phenomena). While these facilities are the means through which power is exercised, from the perspective af instiluti~nal properties they constitute organizational str•uctiu~es af domifurtiun, which reflect the fact that all social systems are marked by an asymmetry cif authorit~Ytivc and allocative resources. Ho~~ever, there always remains the potential for agents to act to change a particular structure of domination, a potentiality referred to as the durlectic ~f' cvntrv! by Giddens (198x, p. 16 ): " ... all firms af depen~Jence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors." When a given asymmetry af resources is drawn on by human actors in interaction, the existing structure of domination is reaffirmed. Ic is only when the existing asymmetry of resources is changed-either-through being explicitly alterc;d or tllr~ugh being gradually and imperceptibly shifted -that the existing structure of domination may be moclifiecl Ur undermined.
-From an agency perspective, norms are organizational conventiotls vr rules governing legitimate or "ap~ropridte" coiaduct. Interaction in organizations does not occur blindly but is guided by the application cat' narm~rtit~e sci~rctio~rs, expressed through the cultural norms prevailing in stn organization. From the perspective of institutional properties, however, norms constitute organizational sh•rrctrrres af le~ili-n~crtion, whereby ~i moral order within an orgr►nization is arkiculated and sustained through rituals, 50ClillÍZílfl011 pl"c~CUCeS, and traclitiUn.
Giddens does nol caplicitly address the issue of tc;chnolc~gy in his structuratic~n paradigm, and while siructuration theory has been employed tv study tcchnolo~ry-induced organizational ch~inge (Barley 1.9ís6) , rind applied to the use cif gr~~up decision support systems (Poole and DeSanclis 1989, 1 a9Q) and computer conferencing systems (Robey, Vaverek and Saunders 19K9) , no attem~~t has been made tv use sh~ucturation theory tc~ r~coneeptualize the n~ti~n of technology, and to reformulate tl~e r~:lationship between technology and organizations. In suggesting that wi; try and understand technology from the pint of view of struct~►ration, I propane that it he considered as one kínci taf structural property cif organizations developing and/or using technology. That is, tecl~nalogy embodies end hence is an instantiatí~n of some oC the rules and resources constituting the structure of an organizalic~n. The details of a structurational model of technology are explicated in the following sectien, and the mooiel is then illustrated by drawing on empirical werk.
P►•er~iises cif n S'tructuratiarc~! M~clel of Tecli~tology
Technology is created and changed Ley human ~tcticin, yet it is also used by humans tv aecc~m{~lish some <<zlio~i. 'Phis recursive nutiwl of technology-which l call the cli~~lity o~ techrtol~~,~}~-is the first of the premises 1 elahoratc below. The second, a corollary oí' the first, is that te.chn~l~gy is iirte~~~~•e~irc=/y ~le:rible, hence that the interaction of technology and a~-ganizations is a function of the different actors ~111(I socio-historical ec~ntexts implicated in its development and use.. _ ..
(i) The Duality of Tec/z~►olo~y. The duality of technology identities prior views of technology-as either objective force or as socially constructed product-a5 a false dichotomy. Technology is the product of human action, while it also a5sumcs structural properties. That is, technology is physically constructed by actors working in a given social context, and technalo~ry is socially constructed by actors through the different meanings they attach to it and the w~rious features they emphasize and use. However, it is also the case that once devele~ped and deployed, technology tends to become reified and institutionalized, losing its connection with the human agents that constructed it vr gave it meaning, and it appears to be part ~f the objective, structural properties of~ the organization.
Agency and structure are not independent. It is the ongoing action of human agents in habitually drawing on a technology that objectifies and instituticmalizes it. Thus, if agent~ changed the technology-physically or interpretively-every time they used it, it would not assume the stability and taken-for-grantedness that is necessary for institutionalization. But such a constantly evolving interaction with technology would undermine many cif the ~1CIVilll~agcs that accrue from using technology to accom~~lish work. We do not need to physically or socially reccrostruct the telephone, elevator, or typewriter every time wc use it. However, there clearly are occasions where continued unreflective use of a technology is inappropriate or inefl'ective. Wynne (1988, p. 15~) , for example, describes the case of a Qritish water-transfer tunnel designed in the seventies to serve the huge increase in water demand expected as a result of the projected industrial and residential growth of Lancashire. At the time of the design ~~nd implcmentalion of the technolr~gy, it was assumed that the scheme would Pump continually and at full capacity. However, a decade later it turned out that these social assumptions had been incorrect; Lancashire was econc~m-ically depressed and water demand had not increased. As a result, the scheme was only used intermittently and lay stagnant for periods of several weeks. Such operation of the scheme allo~vecl the formation of a large void in the tunnel, which eventually caused a major methane explosicm in the: tunnel with significant loss of life. The operation of the technology depended in this case on the once-relevant, but nowobs~lete and forgotten assumptions about the socio-ecopointe growth cif the area. Hiving been designed and built into the technology, these assumptions served as conditions for the "normal" operation of the technol~~gy. That the conditions were no longer applicable tv current operational circumstances vas no longer k~iown to users, and unavailable for reflection by them or the technology sponsors and developers who were long gone.
As was indicated above, a crucial aspect of human action is that it is knowledgeable and reflexive. Agency refers to capability not intention~ility, although action talen by humans may have intended and unintended ec~nsequences. For example, a company's adoption of electronic mail may have the intcncied consequence of increasing communication and information sharing, and the unintended consequence of reducing status barriers and social context cues (Sproull and Kiesier 19 6) . Further, while ~ersnnal action cif human agents using technology has a direct effect (incended and unintended) on local conditions, it also has 1n indirect effect (often unintended) vn the inskitutional environment in which the agents arc situated. For example, a person may use a s~~readsheet program t~ compute an orglniz~ition's annual revenues, vr to create the impression of a legitimate business, but the e(t'ect of that action is tcr eaffirm the relevance and primacy of the "rules of ~iccountability" established by the accounting profession. Even where actions ~u~e directly intended to preserve or change some aspect ol~ the institutional environment, the result is not guaranteed. For example, managers may implement automated production procedures to reposition their organization competitively. ~I~hc result may be that since the orgtinization's operations are now much more dependent on the technology, they arc also more vulnerable to technological breakdowns which disrupt workNow, increase costs and delays, and adversely affect customers.
(ii) The Interpretive Flexibility of 7echrrolo~y. As we saw above, the duality of technology has tended to be suppressed in organizational discourse iii favor of a dualism which emphasizes only one view of technology. Tv some extent this myopia is fostered by the fact that one aspect of the duality is often invisible in organizations. With many types of technology the processes of development and use are often accomplished in different organizations. That is, many of the actions that constitute the technology are often separated in time eind sp<~ce from the actions that are co,asrirurecl by the technology, with the former typically occurring in vendor organizations, and the latter occurring in customer sites. In these circumstances, it is nat surprising that users of a technology often treat it as a closed system or "black box," while designers tend to adopt an open systems perspective on technology.
This time-space discontinuity is related to the nc~tians of temporal scope that were examined above. The dualistic view of technology as fixed object or as product of human action is influenced by the different temporal stages of technology that investigators have chosen to focus on. Recognizing the time-space discontinuity between the design and use of technology gives us insight into how it faas promoted the conceptual dualism dominating. the literature (sec Figure 4) . Researchers examining the design and development of a technology (the left-hand side of Figure 4 ) are confronted with the essentially constructed nature of the technology. They examine how technology designers, influenced by the institutional properties of their organization (arrow 1), fashion ar~d construct ~ technology to meet managerial goals (arrow 2). Such studies are less likely to treat tez,hnology as fixed or objective, recognizing its dynamic and contingent features (as in the strategic choice studies). Researc)ters examining the utilization af a technology in an office or factory, on the other hand (the right-hind side of Figure 4) , ficus on how users of technology are influenced by the given technology (arrow 3), and how the technology afi~ects institutional properties of the a•ganization (arrow 4). Such researchers are less inclined to Focus on the human agency that initially produced the technology, and tend nol to recognize the ongoing scacial and physical construction ~f technology that occurs during its use.
Rather than positing design and use as disconnected moments or stages in a technology's lifecycle, the structurational model of technology posits artifacts as potentially modifiable throughout their exisíence. In attempting to understand technology as continually socially and physically constructed, it is useful to discriminate analytically between human action which affects technology and that which is affected by lechnol~gy. I suggest that we recognize human interaction with technology as having two iterative modes: the ~esig~r mole and the u.se 1i~ode. I emphasize that this distínclion is an analytical convenience only, and that in reality these modes of interaction are tightly coupled.
Even as we recognize that technologies are cicsigned and used recursively, we also need to acknowledge the difFerences among technologïes in the degree to which users can effect redesign. While we can expect a greater engagement of puma❑ agents during the initial development of a technology, this does not discount the ongoing potential fot• users ta change it (physically and socially) throughout their inter~iction with it. In using a technology, users interpret, appr~priaie, and manipulate it in various ways, being influenced by a number o1' individual. and social factors. Despite these opportunities for engagement with technology, however, rigid and routinized views of, and interactions with, technology do develop. Such developments are a function of the interaction Uehveen technology and carganizations and are not inherent in the nature of technology.
For example, many technologies such as manufacturing and medical technologies have assumed such a rigidity at their pint of deployment-the factory floor or the hospital-that they appear to be fixed means of productjun. But even the most "black box" technology has tv be apprehended and activated by human agency to he effectual, anci in such interaction users shape technology and its effects. For example, JónSscm and Grónlund (1988) describe }tow machine operators participate in its testing and adaptation, while Wynne (1988) cites instances where operators of a range of technological systems-from airplanes to chemical plants-routinely deviate from formal, rule-bound operating practices to deal with complex interclepcndencies, unanticipated events, and the contingencies of local conditions. The Challenger shuttle disaster is a ease in point. The inquiry rcvealecl that the space shuttle had often been operaled with various malfunctioning components, and because U-ring damage and I~akage hacl been experienced frequently during the shuttle flight history, " ... the experts lido come. t~ accept it as a new normality" (Wynne 198b, p, 15l) . Wynne ❑otcs aUout this end the other technological cases: "The whole system can be seen to have been evolving uncertainly according to innumerable nil /loc judgements and assumptions. These created a new set of more private informal rules' beneath the discourse of formal rules and check procedures" [ibid.). Examples of sab~tagc and avoidance ~f use in more rigid technologies such as assembly lines, chemical plants, and power stations further illustrate the Tole af user Shaping technology and its effects (Per•row 1983; Shaiken 1985 ; Wynne 1 a88), while studies of offices reveal similar patterns of users influencing techn~l~gy through informal practices, avoidance behavior, or "working tc~ rule" (Carson 1988; Hotivard 1.985; Markus 1983; Zubof~ 1988) . Mackay (1988) , for example, describes how users of an electronic mail system employed difiFerent strategies for using it b<<sed on their different task contingencies and individual preferences. As a result, the technology was appropriated in diverse ways anc] came to have difTerent meanings and effects for different users.
What is critical in discriminating between more or less rigid technologies is the capacity of users to control their interaction with the technology and its characteristics. Because users can potentially exercise such control at any time during a technology's existence, the apparent disjuncture between the design and use stages is artiíicial and misleading. I will use the term inte~Pretir.~e flerihility, following Pinch and Bijk~; r (1984 , 1987 , to refer to the degree to which users of a technology are engaged in its constit~~tion (physically anti jor socially) during development or use. Interpretive flexibility is an attribute of t11e relationship between humans and technology and hence it is inftuenccd by characteristics of the material artifact (e.g., the specific hardware and software comprising the technalagy), characteristics of the human agents (e.g., experience, motivakion), and characteristics of the context (e.g., social relations, task assignment, resource allocations).
While the notion af interpretive fle~bility recognizes that there is flexibility in the design, use, and interprekation of technology, the factors influencing wt allow us to acknowledge that the interpretive flexibility of any given technology is not infinite. On the ene hand, it is constrained by the material characteristics af that technology.
['echnology is at some level physical in nature and hence baundeci by the state of the art in materials, energy, and so on. On the other hand, it is constrained by the institutional contexts (structures of signification, legitimation and domination) and different levels of knowledge and dower affecting actors during the technology's design and t~se. For example, the initial designers of a technology have tended to align with managerial objectives (Markus and Bjorn-Andersen 1987; Noble 1984; Sterling 1984) , with the result that many technologies reinforce the institutional status quo, emphasizing standardization, control, and efficiency. However, there is nothing inevitable about this alliance, and it may shift as the traditional division af I~tbor between designers and users blurs with the increased deployment of computer-based artifacts (Hirschhorn 1984; Shaiken 1985) , and as users of technology grow in number, influence, and knowledge. It may also be influenced by changing economic conditions which may pressure managers to alter strategies, organizational forms, and operating norms. The structurational mortel of technology comprises the following components: (i) human agents-technology ~íesigners, users, and decision-.makers, (ii) technology -material artifacts mediating task execution in the workplace; and (iii) institutional properties of organizations, including organizational dimensions such as structural arrangements, business strategies, ideology, cultw-e, control mechanisms, standard operating procedures, division of labor, expertise, communication patterns, as well as environmental pressures such as government regulation, competitive forces, vendor strategies, professional norms, state of knowledge about technology, and socio-econ~mic conditions. The following discussion of the structuratianal model of technology makes reference to the relationships depicted in rigure 5.
I. Technology is tf~e product of h~c»r~rr action (arrf~w a). As a human artifact, technology o~aly tames into existence through cY•eative Human action, and is sustained by llumati action through the ongoing maintenance and adaptation of technology (automobiles need servicing, typewriters require new ribUons, and even pencils Herti sharpening). Further, human action constitutes technology through using it. That is, once created, technology is deployed in organizations but remains inanimate and hence ineí~ectual unless it is given meaning and is manipulated -directly or indirectly -by humans. On its own, technology is of no import; it plays no meaningful role in human afl~airs. Il is only through the ~tppr~priation of technology by hum~Ans (whether for productive vr symbolic ends) that it plays a significant role and hence exerts influence. It is only through human action that technology qua technology can be understood. "fhe interpretive flexibility af technology operates in two modes of interaction. In the design ►node, human agents build into technolo~,ry certain inter~rctive schemes (rules reflecting knowledge of the work being automated), certain facilities (resources to accomplish that work), and certain norms (rules that define the organizationally sanctioned way of executing that work). In the use rnocle, human agents appropriate technology by assigning sh~u~ed meanings to it, which influence their appropriation of the interpretive schemes, facilities, and norms designed into the tedinology, thus allowing those elements to influence their' task execution. In many organizations, individuals may have little control over when or how lo use technology, and hence little discretion over which meanings and elements influence their interaction with it. But these constraints are institutional, and are nc~t inherent in the technological u~tif~ict itself. Users can always choose (at the risk of censure) not to utilize a technology, or choose to modify their engagement with it. The nation that technology needs to be appropriated by humans retains the element of control that users always have (however slight) in interacting with technology.
Il. Tec/tnalogy is the medium of ~iurna~r ac~io~~ ~lll7'O{N Li). Becfiuse technology is used by workers, it mediates their activities. Anyone who has used a lype~~vriter, telephone, computer, hammer, ar pencil can attest that technology facilitates the performance cif certain kinds of work. That the technology also constrains the performance by facilitating it in a particular manner is an important corollary of this. This influence resembles that posited by earlic;r examinations of the "impacts of technology" vn the use af technology. However, there are t~vo significant dili~et-ences in the structurational model. One is the recognition that technology cannot det~rrnine social practices. Human agency is always needed to use technology and this implies the possibility of "choosing to act otherwise." Thus, technology can only condition social practices. The other difference is the acknowledgement that technology, in conditioning social practices, is bath facilitating and constraining. Technology does not only constrain or only enable, but rather sloes both. This dual influence has typically not heen recognized in studies that attempt tv determine definitively whether• technology has "positive" or "negative" effects (Attewell and Rule 1984; Hartmann et al. 1986 ). Giddens' (1984) framework ~~llows us to recognize that technology-as a medium of social practices-necessarily has both restricting and enabling implications. Which implication dominates depends vn multiple factors including the <~etions and motives of designers and implementors, the institutional context in which technology is embedded, and the autonomy and capability of particular users.
Other influences that reflect the interaction between human agents and structural properties are also relevant to a study of technology use in organizations. However, to punctuate the key aspects of technology, only those influences directly involving technology a~~e discussed here. 'Two such influences are pzrticular(y important in the structuratinnal model of technology.
III. One influence concerns the nature ~f human action in c~rganizati~ns, which is situated action, and hence shaped by organizational contexts (arrow c). When acting gil technology (whether• designing, appropriating, m~diíying, or even resisting it), human agents are influenced by the institutional properties of their setting. They draw on existing stocks of knowledge, resources, and norms to perform their work. Often these influences are unarticulated, or reflected on canly fleetingly by Duman agents (Giddens 1984) , and are here referred to as the instrtutivnn! corulition,s of interaction wit{~ ~ech~zology. Anderson (1988) compared the development of numerically controlled (NC) equipment in two different contexts, the U.S. and Norway, and found that different institutional settings, funding, labor relations, socio-economic conditions, and cultural traditions shaped very different kinds of NC technologies. The case of the British water-transfer tunnel (Wynne 1~F38) described above tragically reveals how particular institutional conditions inNuenced the design and development of a specific technology, while Barley's (1986 Barley's ( , 1990 ) examination of how two dif£ereni Hospitals used similar medieal scanning technology shows how difl'erent instituti~nai conditions influenced the way people interacted with technology, Technology is built and used within certain social anci historical circumst~~nc:es and its form and functioning will bear the imprint of those conditions. IV. The final infiucnce involves the manner in which huma►~ action when it uses technology acts upon the institutional properties of an organization (a1•ro►v c!), either by reinforcing them (more typically) or by transforming them (less frequently). Technology is an "enacted environment" (Weick 1979, p. 260 ) whose construction and use is conditioned by an organization's structut'es of signification, domination, and legitimation. The a}~propriatic~n and use cif technology implies the change ar' reinforcement of these three institutional structures. These effects-comprising the ir►stitulional c~riseguences ~f interaction with technolo~ry-are often not reflected an by users, who are generally unaware of their role in either rea(~irming or disrupting an irtstitutianal status quo. When users conform tv the technology's embedded ~•ules and resources, they unwittingly sustain the i~~stitutional structures in which the tcchn~logy is deployed.
When users do nit use the technology as it was intended, they may undermine and sometimes transform the embedded rules and resources, and hence the institutional context and strategic objectives of the technology's creators, sponsors, and implementors. This may happen more frequently than one would imagine. Perrow (1983) and Wynne (1.988) show how users operating complex technologies often have to cíeal with high levels of stress, ambiguity, and unstructured loci( situations that deviate from "normal" operaíing conditions. In these situations, the negotiated or enacted use of technology is often very dift~erent to the prescribed, mecht~nical operation of the technology. Wynne notes (1988, p. 1S2): "Thus implementing design commitments and operating technological systems involves the continua! invention and negotiation of new rules and relationships, not merely the enactment of designed ones. This develops the technology in unanticipated ways as it is `normalized'." Tyre's (1988) study of process technology includes the case of a new grinding machine being intraclticed into an automated manufacturing plant. Initial integration problems forced project engineers to install a temporary manual "workaround." Although the manual workaround was inefficient, operators quickly learned to slepend an it to accomplish their work. Later, when the grinder was fully functional, operators prevented the engineers from dismantling the "temporary" workaround. The new techn~l~gy with its workaround has become so integrated into operators' routines that it became the "normal" or institutionalized mode of operating the grincJing machine.
In the model of technology proposed here, structuration is understood as a dynamic process which is embedded historically and contextually. While the main components and nature of relationships underlying this model are considet•ed relatively staUle, their range, coníent, and relative power will vary over time. In addition to being dynamic, structuration is understood to be a dialectical process, hence inherently contradictory. In contrast ta models that relate elements linearly, the structurationrll model assumes that elements intei•aet recursively, may he in opposition, and that they may undermine each other's eft~ects. An example is the tencleney of technology to become reified in organizations, thus becoming detached from the human action that constructed it. "I'hc typical apprehension of technologies as given and objective directly contradicts their inherently constructed nature. Recognizing potential contradictions helps us ta understand points of tension and instability in organizations, and how these may interact tc~ change and transform organizations.
Using the Structurational Model of Technology
'Phis section illustrates the str•ucturational model of technology by interpreting the findings of a field research study (Qrlikowski 1988) , which investigated the use of infoi•mati~n technology in a large, multi-national software consulting Firm, Beta Corporation,
Research Site ]n 1987, Bcta earned $600 million dollars in worldwide consulting fees and employed over 13,1)00 consultants in some 200 ofFices in ever 50 countries. Most of Beta's employees are "functional consultants" why engage in the building of cusiomized applicatïon systems for• clients. A small proportion (three percent in 1987) are "technical consultants" who provide technical support (expertise in Hardware and systems software) ro the functional consultants, and engage in research and development. Beta consultants operate in temporary project teams Ind occupy various levels in the firm hierarchy (consultant, senior consultant, manager, and senior manager). Over tt~e last few years Beta has invested c;atensive amounts of information technology in the production work of its consultants. This investment has transformed application systems development-traditionally alabor-intensive, paper-based set of activitïes-into a rationalized, capital-intensive production process. The specific kind of information technology developed tv automate systems development is known in the data processing industry as "Cc~mUuter-Aided Sofkware Engineering" (CASE) technology, and in Beta as "productivity tools."
Research Methorloloky
The study employed ethttographic techniques (Aar 1980; Van Maanen 1979 such as observation of participants, interaction WItII CASE tools, documentation review, social contact, unstructured and semistructurcd interviews. It was executed over eight. months within Beta and in those client sites where Beta developers were building application systems. In the first phase of the resefirch, historical data on the Beta corporation and its systems development practices were gathered from published material (in-house and lracle dress), and from interviews with senior managers who had heen involved in Beta's traditional systems development, as well as its adoptio» of acapital-intensive systems development process. With some background information on Beta and its practices, five difTerent application projects (four large and one small) were selected for in-depth analyses. Projects were not selected al random but were strategic~(ly identified to guarantee exposure tv the use of CASE tools in all major phases of the systems develop►nent lifecycle (requirements analysis, conceptual design, detailed design, implementation, and testing).
An average of four weeks was spent on each project, observing and interviewing learn members in their daily systems development work, and in their interaction with. each other and the CASE tools. One hundred and twenty formal interviews were conducted, each lasting an average of one and a half hours, and many mare information meetings and exchanges tank place. Participation in the research was voluntary and, while the particular projects studied were approved by Beta's senior management, individuals spanning all Beta's hierarchic levels were invited to participate in the study by the researcher alone. Other key informants were identified and sought vut both within and outside Beta, such as the senior recruiting officer, the director of research and devel~pmenc, sales directors, major client managers, and former Bela employees. Data were also collected throughout the study at monthly tall day) division meetings, and in project training sessions on CASE tools.
We can examine Beta's development and use of productivity tools in terms cif the processes through which the technology was integrated into Beta's operations over lime. These processes will then ve interpreted through a series of structuratianal models, depicted in Figures 6 through 8.
Stage L• Initial Development of 7echru~Jo~~}~. About a decade ago, Beta's senior maa~agers decided that to maintain their profitabiliq~ ratio and beat the competition they needed to increase productivity, hence decreasing t}ie length ~f systems development, and reducing the number of consultants required on each project. They also wanted to improve management leverage by increasing the number of consultants per senior manager (expanding span of control). They also wanted to diminish their dependence on the technical knowledge required for the multiple different computer configurations operated by their clients. In the past, Beta had to ensure that ln the following, a reference to "consultt~nts" refers tc~ functioael consultants, unless otherwise indicated.
consultants knew a range of programming languages, database management, teleprocessing, and operating systems to be sufficiently versatile tv operate in many technological environments. Such knowledge is highly technical, idiosyncratic, and quickly becomes obsolete as new computer products continually appear nn the market.
The task ot' constructing productivity tools was delegated to Beta's technical consultants, who constructed computer routines that encoded knowledge of systems development. In order to automate Beta's systems development practices the technical consultants had t~ articulate and rationalize the existing manual procedures that functional consultants utilized daily in their work. In this they were helped by the existence within Beta of a systems development methodology, which specifiecJ in great detail the rules and routines fir executing each systems development task.
When Beta first began consulting in the early sixties there were no formal standards or guidelines by which software consultants conducted their practice. Application systems were built by trial and error. Over time, a Uody of in-house systems development knowledge accumulated through the sharing of experiences, and some informal checklists were compiled and circulated. But the software consulting practice kept growing (about 15U percent annually) and Beta acquired more personnel and clients. The informal tradition with which Beta's practice guidelines were learned and communicated was no longer adequate. The guidelines were too openended, assumed too much competence, and could not deal with exceptional conditions. Projects had become bigger and more complex, the stakes higher, and losses more severe and visible. In response, Beta managers set up a firm-wide task force to codify the informal systems development heuristics, expanding them where appropriate, and formally instituting practice guidelines. Thus, Beta's official and eomprehensive systems development methodology was created. It prescribed a sequence of systems developmc;nt stages, articulated the tasks and deliverables of each stage, defined the skills needed to perform the tasks, estaUlished guidelines for estimating time and budget requirements, and specified duality conh~ol and process milestones. While prescriptive in documentation, the tenets ~f the methodology were oFten overridden in practice, with consWtants relying on their initiative to perform work, using the methodology primarily as an orienting device.
An important condition for the rationalization of systems development werk and hence the development of the technology was the prior instituticmalizaiion af Beta's systems development met}iodology. Despite the lack of congruence between the prescriptions of the methodology and systems development practice, the technical consultants turned to Beta's systems development methodology for a rational, structured, and thorough account of systems development work. While the tools were inteiaded to standardize consulting work, in fact, the standardiLation had preceded the development of the tools, The tools gave management an opportunity to push standardization further, and more importantly, to enforce ít in practice, which huid not been feasible before.
The developnment of productivity tools within Beta can be described in terms of the structuratic~nal model (see Fïgure 6). Commissioned by senior management, technical consultants were influenced in their development work by their managers' strategy. This management strategy authorized the all~c~ition of resources to technical consultants facilitating; their construction of tools. This canstructioa~ was also influenced by Beta's ext~lilf Systems development methodology which provided the interpretive schemes and n~rn~s that technical consultants drew on to develop tl~e productivity tools. The productivity tools were thus produced through the human agency of Beta's technical c~nsulta~rts (arro►v 1). In order ro achieve this ec~nstruction, the technical consultants' actions were influenced by Beta's institutional properties (ar►•o~v 2), most notably the existing institutionalized knowledge and norms of Beta' systems develop- ment methodology (structw•es of signification and legitimation), and the resources (time, money and authority) distributed to the technical consultants by senior managers (structure of domination).
,Stage II: Instilutionn/ized Use of Technology. Once developed, the productivity tools were deployed vn project teams. The diffusion of these tools was incremental at first, until the technology proved sufficiently robust to become mandatory on all large >>rojects. When consultants use fools, their systems development work is mediated by the assumptions and rules huilt into the tools. As a medium ot human action, the tools can he zeen to both constrain as well as facilitate the activities of consultants. The technical consultants designed and built the tools so that work is executed in a standardized, structured, and predictable manner, which leaves little discretion in the hands of individual consultants. The tools also reflect the assumptions of management and technical consultants that the process of systems development is rational, sequential, and unambiguous, that consultants should interact passively with tools, and that they have little technical understanding of computer systems. The effect of such design decisions is that the technology disciplines the consult~u~ts' execution of their systems development tasks (arrow 3 irr Figure 7 ).
For example, consider the task of interrace design. Prior to Beta's deployment of tools, screens were designed manually, either on paper or via laborious ananual manipulation on video display units. Consultants would design screens by positioning data fields in appropriate areas of the display, styling each field tv the requisite format, and personally ensuring that appro~~riatc standards and conventions were adhered ta Screen design was atime-consuming and individualized task. As one senior manager explained, tools rationalized this process in order tv:
... enforce ergo~tontic desi,Gns of srreei~s. {die ►vn~~r fu ~;et co~i.ciste~tlly gonrl d~~.+r,tiirs, and ij' ~+~i~ lrnre~ it up 10 the caisuhnnls, we ►+~c~~ddit't gel n~q~ consiste»ry. 11'e/!..~nrn~~ of ~h~rn~ ~nnp hr hlich<~lnngela.,•, but their tltev cu~dd also br Jncksun Pollat'ks! With tools, consultants merely invoke the screen design tools on tl~cir workstations and, in response to the tools' prompts, enter the data fields to be used in each screen. 7'he screen design tools, programmed with a sophisticated algorithm, determine (via predefined "ergonomic heuristics") the most appropriate layout and formatting oï fields on the screen. Screen designs are then automatically generated. Significant time savings are achieved, as well as same flexibility. For exam~~le, if a consultant subsequently realizes that a data field has been inadvertently omitted, it is a simple matter to invoke the tools, change that screen's input parameters, and have the tools generate a new design. Without tools, such changes had to he done manually, and were tedious and time-consuming.
This example demonstrates the role of technology as both an enabler of, and a constraint on, human action. On tl~e one hand, tools allow the consultants tv design screens more quickly than before, relieving them of the monotonous task of' fc~rmat-ting fields, and further assititing modifications as these are required. On the other hind, the tools constrain the consultants in that they are limited to the formatting options available in the tools' repertoire. Screens that do not match the predefined templates cannot be designed within the scope of the tools, and institutional pressures within Beta (arrv►~~ 4 in Figure 7 ) operate to discourage consultants to bypass the tools and manually create unique screen designs. Ccrosultants are expected tv use the tools in their work, and deviating from this organizational norm typically results in a reprimand. Further, Beta's projects operate under extremely tight schedules, which compel consultants to perform werk in the standard way because this is easier and quicker. Executing work cli(~~erently is inconvenient, disruptive ot' schedules, hence to he avoided. A consultant reported:
!n the front-crid ~s~hen ►rr ~t~ere dr,cig~tir~g iti~ith !he screen and report ~lesrgn i~dirors, eve ~rn~nrl ►~~i~ it~ere !carting clie~t~s on ~v ncrept the sc•reen.s imr( reports in certain J'onnuts, bccuttse dial's !!tc way the d<~sig~r roo! ►+~n►t~s rl do~u~. So so»telin►c~s Ihe~ client vas j'orced to accept designs hecni~se ~~f uttr ~echnicul e►n'71'0/1111 P/1 f . This constraint encouraged constiltants tv try tv perstiadc clie~ls to accept the scrcrn formats that had heen generated by the tools. A typical tactic was ta invoke the "technological imperative": It has tv he that ►a~ay; tl~c~t's the ally ►+'ay the tools will work. That screens could be manually custom-designed was not mentioned, and computer-náive clients were mistakenly led ro believe that the technology is detcrministic. It was not only much easier for ccrosultants to accept the tools' pre5criptionti than having ic> custom-produce the screen designs preferred by clients, but this also meant that their individual schedules were not disrupted. Sv consultants, pressured as they are by their project managers' work plans, put pressure vn clients tv accept those designs that are automatically generated by the tools. It seems that the "technological imperative"-rather than being an inherent aspect of technology-can be socially constructed, a pa~uduct of the social practices that evolve around the use of a technology.
From the perspective of the individual consultants, the tools constrain their werk because executing the various tasks of systems development requires conforming tv the ciict<<tes of the tools. Systems development work which is mediated by a technol-ogy that emphasizes sland~~rdization is no longer performed under the discretion of individual consultants, In the manner in which Beta has implemented productivity too11 tv mediate systems development, nit only is task execution influenced, but also cognition about the task. Most consultants, particularly recruits, do not recognize the way in which tools generate processes ~f reality construction both far themselves end the clients whose jobs ai•e being automated. Since the deployment of tools in Beta, systems development has come to be understood as an activity essentially performed by means of productivity hols. Tools have become a mechanism for technical control, delimiting the ways consultants perceive and interact with their werk.
Once use of the productivity tools is taken-for-granted, they have become institutionalized, and their use by consultants in project work influences Beta's institutional struch~re (arrow 5 irr Figure 7) . In terms of the structurational model, the roots represent a set of rules and resources drawn on by organizational members in their everyday action, hence comprising part cif Beta's structures of signification, domination, and legitimation. Tools contribute to Beta's strcrcture of signification because the knowledge embedded in them (in the form of concepts and p1•ocedures) directs the manner in which problems are interpreted and work is conducted. Thus, when consultants use the tools they are subscribing tv the interpretive schemes that constitute Beta's systems development knowledge. This was intentional, as a senior manager noted:
C3y ht~ildin,4 standards into tools we cr"t c~» ~t~•ot w~r~u neo~le ~10 r~,rd ho►►~ they rlo it. it'e nre nv logger depen~leni nu rlie knowledge ier people's lrencls. So if people leute, ►ve Ure~i't stuik. 7aols nllu~ti~ us to ptt kno►vledgc into ri s~nrcltnz~ and embers i~ in ~ec/t~rolugy.
The tools' influence nn action is not unnoticed by the consultants. A senior consultant observed:
Toole force peop/~ to drink iet n <'ertrrin wa}~. We nl! !/tink screens nerd reports. So ►t•e don't /:ate n chance la think if d2ings c~n~lrl he dote n hrtter way. . , . Two/s /t«ec riefrnitely ,ctoppc~( me thinking nbc~r~t other x~rrys of dob~g thinb~s. !Ve bring !he some mindset lo the difJereN pr~ojectc, sn eve nlreacfy kn~ti+~ whclr tv do. while a consultant remarked similarly: if'hen yvu rely ar tools you rnlieren~(~~ nrsume certain thins, unr! hence this hindc~~s ~~our nhility ~~ sec asher tltirigs. Ï~ make nn u~ralagy, i1 '.r like nh~)~i~r.~~ ~ti~ith n pock vj'rcrrris: yn~t l~nre ~t~ pick u cr~~•d n~r~ ~j thn 52 r~~~nilnble; you crrn'~ ~rck the 53rr1. S~ I~nls dente n sU•uct~rre tc~ work ~+~itlt, G«l tive J'r~!l i~No the rr«p u/ ~u~r secir~g beyv~~c! it.
Tools contribute tQ Beta's structure of doniinutioit because they constitute resources wllicli are deployed in order to control the work of consultants. While rmplcmented locally in each project, thy; productivity tools were designed and built centrally by the technical consultants. Through the tools' inbuilt assumptions, features, and standardized procedures they exert unobtrusive control over the nature of work, and the coordination of consultants can projects. As far as Beta is concerned, the primary Uroduction procc;ss has become too criticzl to risk autonomous action at project level. The technological infrastructure provided by the tools at each project serves ro institutionalize ~ mechanism of centralized control within Beta. Without human agents actively utilizing the technology, however, the centralized control invested in it is inefTcctual. Consultants have to appropriate the tools in order to activate tl~e centralized control, anc! in so doing they unintentionally reinforce the institutionalized eentrol imposed on khem through the technology. Thus, an unin-tended consequence of each use of the tools is the reaffirmation of Beta's system of domination. Of course, where consultants choose nat to use the tools in the authorized manner a• choose to bypass the tools altogether (see below), they undermine this system of cl~mination.
Tools contribute to Beta's slrerctiu~e of legitimntiorr because they sanction a particular mode of developing systems, and propagate a set of norms about what is eind what is not acceptable "professional" social practice. In mandating productivity tools on all large projects, Beta is sending a message fhat tools are the only legitimate way of developing large systems. Hence, the very deployment of technUlo~ry within Beta is an application of a normative sanction. By implementing technology tc~ su~p~rt or automate work, management signals that the technology is an appropriate means for executing that work. Further, the rules embodied within the tools incorporate certain norms about the appropriate criteria and priorities to he applied tv systems clevelopmcnt work, and the manner in which the work is ta be conducted. In applying productivity tools to systems develc~pmcnt, the priorities, assumptions, and values embedded in the tools act as a moral imperative, comprising elements in Beta'S system of legitimation.
In the case of Beta, unreflective use of the productivity tools is a very effective way of controlling the cognitions and actions of consultants. Beta's commitment to using a Standardized development approach can be seen as an aspect of firm ideology as well as strategy. Tools are clearly not only instrumental (structuring the production process) they are also normative, as they mediate a shared reality within Beta, producing uniformity and predictability in thought and Uehavior. And this is impartant for building solidarity ancJ communal norms, and for rendering consultants interchangeable and dispensable. A senior manager suggested that tools:
... prot•ide n basic la~tgttngc~ so ~+~e cnn nll rela►e io dtr t•ocnhulary mtd the ~rorn►s of nclio~t. ~htr conceptual nppmciatiun is the seine, sv wr c~ni~ strbslilute people cpn projects easily.
Because the. norms of interaction etre embedded in the tools, each interaction is highly efficient-minimizing the need for clarification or amplification -and eft'ective -serving tt~ ~•einforcc Beta's shared reality, assumptions, and values. The result typically is a reaffirmation of the status c~uo, a reinforce►nent of Beta's System of legitimation.
Stab~e II1: O~r~~vin,~ Irrteractioli ►vilh tl~e Tec/tnology. The pl'OC~UCt1V1iy t0(JIS were designed and implemcntcci by Beta managers and technical consultants to increase efficiency of production ~~ork through rationalization and standardization. Today, productivity tools serve to constitute the development work of thou~aiids of Beta's consultants, who were nat involved in the development of the. tools. This encourages a passivity and results-orientation among the consultants (aided and abetted by Beta's competitive incentive system) that discourages reflectiveness. Notwithstanding such effects, however, knowledgeable; and reflexive human agents are capable of altering the controlling influence of the technology. The extent to which individuals modify thc;ir use of technology, however, depends vn whether they acknowledge its constructed nature. 'Phis is determined by the degree to which individuals can recognize the; mediating role of technology, can ccmceive of an alternative heyond it, and are ►motivated to action.
At the current stage of tool use and development in beta, the toils have nat yet matured as fully standardized products (breakdowns still occur and local adjustments are often needed on projects). However, when toils become "seamless" as ~i manager described Beta's goal to fully integrate the tools into systems development work, their identification as means of production, cii5tinct from the activities and outcomes they facilitate, will be far more difficult. As tools become more taken-for-granted than they are already, the ability for consultants to reflect vn them and hence act ~~~ithc~ut or beyond them, b~;comes more remote. Relevant here is Heidegger's (1962) nc~ticm of presefrl-rit-hand, which notes that objects typically form part of the, background of an activity, without our explicit recognition of them as separate objects, and it is only when the objects break down that they confront us with their existence. The more tools "seamlessly" facilitate syste►ns development, the more they will be laken-fargranted, and the more they are used unreflectively the more they will constrain human action (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. ~2) .
Human agency, however, through the dialectic of control, can act against the apparent determinism of institutionalized artifacts. if users acknowledge that technology is interpretively flexible, they can tnc~dity their interpretation and use of it. Given most af the consultants' relatively tow levels of technical experience, i3eta's institutional context with its centralized control mechanisms and standardized work procedures, and the relatively rigid design of the technology, use of Beta's productivity tools tends to be characterized, on the whole, by low interpretive flexibility. Some consultants, howevc;r, ~u•c able to recognize the ctmstructecl nature of the tools they use-either because they are computer science graduates or had experienced systems development unmedi~led by tools-and on occasion they do attempt to modify their interactions with the tools.
Consult~u~ts reacted against the tools when they believed the tools imposed unreasonable constraints on their behavior. For example, consultants could not initiate certain tasks unless some other tasks in a certain sequence had been completed first and tv a level of completeness specified by the tools. Perceiving this as unnecessarily time-consuming, consultants would aften circumvent the tools in order to get on with the work they wanted to do. They occasionally even resorted to subterfuge. On one Beta project, the consultants perceived the tools tv be particularly limiting, and manipulated their access tv the underlying computer system in a way that allowed them tv surreptitiously bypass the tools. After this convert action had gone on for a while (about a month) it was eventually detected and eradicated. A senior consultant remarked:
... N~lten nN fhrs cnnuy aril. cr big polirical.stiirk Gle«~ rip, IVe ~~~ere t~~ld ave ~vereir't terrn~ players.
In this incident the consultants managed to convince their project managers that tools were unduly restrictive, and a few technical consultants were assigned to modify the functionality of the tools. A partial victory had been won f'or the consultants who, by nit merely reinforcing Beta's institutional structure, had disrupted the taken-forgranted meaning system, power relations and norms operating within the project.
They had altered the functioning of the tools-typically perceived to be the purview of technical consultants-and assumed some control over their task execution. As a result they had forced a change in the technology which gave them a little more discretion in how and when they used the tools. This example indicates ho~v technology cannot be conceived as a fixed ot~ject al any stage during its deploy►nent; its features and implementation patterns can and do change over time through human intervention.
Whether disruption of Beta's institutionalized properties is short term or long-lived depends on the extent to which the deviation from established structures is sustained, and the extent to which the deviant action difliises throughout the firm. degree-may be diminishing in the future. More and more of the consultants, trained only to use tools, are not learning technical skills or getting systems development experience without tools, so it is unlikely that many of them will realize that systems cíevelopment could he done differently, and they will be less inclined to try to alter the technology as they utilize it in their daily work. The contradictory nature of technology is apparent here: tools were built to improve productivity on Beta projects, yet their use creates consultants who are only productive with tools, and who have a "trained incapacity" to do systems development werk in any other way, vr tv recognize when the tools inhibit productive or ~fl'ective work. Figure 8 depicts Beta's ongoing interaction with its productivity tools. Tv conduct their systems development work, functional consultants appropriate tools tv execute their development work (armotitis G). Their appropriation of the tools i5 influenced by Beta's institutional context and their socialization into it (cu•►•vw 7). In using the tools, the functional consultants' action and perccptians of reality (of their work, of the tools, of thcrnselves and their clients) are mediated (facilitated and constrained) by the interpretive schemes, norms, and resources embedded in the productivity tools (arrow 8). Executing systems development work through the tools typically rea(~irms Beta's institutional properties, as expressed in its Structures of signification, domination, and Iegitimati~n (ui•row 9). Occasionally however, the fur~cticmal consultants may deviate in their appropriation cif the tools (cn•r~~w 6), by choosing tv disregard or modity their interaction with the tools. This action undermines the interpretive schemes, norms, and resources embedded in the tools, and, if sulliciently vigorous and sustained, may transform Bc;t~~'s institutional properties by altering aspects of the structures of domination, signification, vr legitimation (arrow 9). This may trigger a change in management strategy, so that managers may authorize technical consultants to modify the tools (arrow 7). r['his would change the form or functioning of the tools (arrow h), but once deployed, tools would again become institutionalized and serve to condition the work of the functional consultants (arrow 8), while also reproducing Beta's institutional system (n►•r~ow 9). This dialectical cycle of relations and interactions between consultants, Beta's itlstitutional properties, and the technology will continue over time, for as long as the productivity tools remain a component in Beta's operating strategy.
Discussion
This paper has explored a number of issues that change the way we think about and study the i~iteraction of' technology and organizations. In particular, t~vo key aspects of technolo~ry have been highlighted, the duality of technology and its interpretive flexibility, both of which have typically been masked by the time-space disjuncture implicated in different stages of a technology's interaction with organizations. The duality of technology tillows us to sec technology as enacted by human agency and as institutionalized in structure. It further focuses attention cm the physical and historical bound~~lness cai' any technological inno~~ation. `I'echnolc~gics are procíucts of their time and organizatic~ntil context, and will reflect the knowledge, materials, interests, and conditions at a given locus in history. There is nothing inevitable vr inviolable about them (Nobly 1y84; Perrow 1983; Zuboífi 1988) .
The time-space disjuncture prevalent in prïor conceptualizations ~f technology is collapsed here by understanding that technologies ha~~e cíifferent degrees of inter~re-tive flexibility. This emphasizes that there is flexibility in how people design, interpret, and use technology, but that thïs Ilexibility is a Yunction of the material components comprising the artifact, the institutional context in which a technology is developed and used, and the power, knowledge, and interests of Human actors (clevelapers, users, and managers). Time, too, influences the interpretive flexibility of technology, as the interpretation and use of technologies in organizations tend ta be habitualized and routinized over time, becoming less apen to conceptual and operational modifieation. Such closure typically becc~n~es sanctioned and institutionalized, in which case the technology assumes a solidity and stability that belies its potential interpretive I~exibility.
The conceptual closure and reification cif technology in organizations is exacerbated by the tendency in industrialized economies to separate technological development from use, so that many of the technologies that mediate work in organizations arrive fully formed vn the factory or oflïce flor. The greater the temporal and spatial distance between the construction af a technology and its application, the greater the likelihood that the technology will be interpreted and used with little fletcibility. Where technology developers consult with or inv~ive future users in the construction and trial stages of a ttehnology, there is an increased likelihood that it will be interpreted and used more flexibly. Tllis should he even more the case where developers ~f a technology are also users of that technology, for example where craftsmen make their own tools ur where users of software design and construct their awn computer applications.
The c~nccp# of interpretative flexil~ility with aspect to technology is pariiailarly pertinent in the light af increased deplc~yn~ent of computer-rased tecluialogies in organizatio»s. Such technologies operate by manipul~~tin~ symbols, and as a consequence, vendors and designers have found it cost-e~l~ective to construct mare "openended" technologies, than has been the case with industrial ones. Fir example, inf~rniation technology is typically constructed and sold by vendors as a general-purpose computing capability on which difl~ercnt applications are co~lstructed and modified by customers over time. Industrial technologies, on the other liancl, have tended to be chea~~er and more efí~cient to produce and use with fixed and standardized components. However•, there is nothing inherent about industrial teclinologi~s that requires greater closure and rigidiq~. If a sufficient amount of resources would be invested in them, they too could support a greater range ~f interpretations and uses. To elate, management has nc~t found it feasible to do so. But information techn~l~gies are changing the economies of production ~tnd use (Child 1985; Jonscher 19f~H) , anti the cost constraints that prohibited more flexible industrial technologies are diminishing with the general shift in many industries tow~irds computer-based technologies.
While economic and technological factors are encouraging a movement eiway from constructing and deploying relatively rigid artifacts, it is nat clear that social and culiueal factors are equally encouraging. The culture of the workplace, managerial ideology, and existing bases of expertise and power significantly influence whit technologies are deployed, how they are understood, and in which ways they are used. Powell (19f~7, p. 196) , citing comparative research into U.S. and Japanese flexible manufacturing systems, notes: "'The United States, it appears, is finding that the mass procíuction ethos is very (lard to escape. ... Japanese workers and managers hive a much greater understanding of what modern technology can do and rely far more on the judgement of people vn the shop floor." Similarly, many organizations do not exploit information technology's potential interpretive flexibility, tending often tv construct inflexible software applic<atíons (Gar~son 19~i8; Zuboff ].488). As the examination of Beta's productivity tools revealed, information technology can he designed, interpreted, and used with relatively low interpretive flexibility to meet the objectives of senior management.
While Giddens' (1)84) theory of ~tructurati~n is posed at the level of society, his structuration processes, describing the reciprocal interaction of social actors and institutíanal properties, are relevant at multiple levels of analysis. The structurational model of technology allows us to conceive and examine the interaction of technology and organizations at interorganizational, organizational, group, and individual levels of analysis. This overcomes the problem of levels of analysis raised by a number of commentators (Kling 1987; Leifer 198$; Markus and Robey 198 ; Rousse~~u 1985) , and underscores the value of understanding the multiple levels across which kechnology interacts with organizations. On(y examining selected relationships-e.g., know technology influences human agents without being mindfiil cif how users appropriate that technology-leads tv a partial understanding ~f technology's interaction with organizations.
By moving across levels of analysis and Uoundaries of time anti space, the structurational model of technology afifords an examination of technology transfer among. organizations. Many of the technologies used by organizations today are not built internally. Itathcr they are acquired from other organizations-either customdesigneci; off-the-shelf, or in some form that is part mass-produced end part customized. Recognizing the disjuncture in lime and space between the design and use mode allows us to analyze the role of multiple organizations in developing and deploying a particular technolo~ry. A tcchnr.~logy may be designed Uy one organization, Quilt by a second, and then transferred into a third for use. In these cases, the institutional co~iclitions and liumán agents involved in technology development are different from those involved in technology use. That is, external entities-the developing organizations-play an influential role in shaping the social practices of the organizations using the technology. Witfin Beta, for example, the toils were developed in-house so there was no other organization influencing the development of the technology. However, }3eta does sell its tools to clients, and in this transfer of technology the institutional properties embedded within Beta's tools, shape the cognitions and ~iciions of tool users in client organizations, and potentially shape the institutional properties of those client organizations. The structurational framework affords a way of investigating not only the movement of technology through time-space, but also across organizational boundaries, potentially providing a basis for analyzing interorganizGitional relations of learning, influence, and denendexlce.T he structurational model of technology does not directly deal with organizational form, which wis considered an institutionalized property of organizations. Future analyses o1~ the relationship vetwem dií~~erent organizational forms and the interaction of technology and human agency are clearly relevant. It would be usefu) to isolate this aspect of organizations analytically and examine how different arganizational forms may engender certain kinds of technologies, and how these technologies zi w<~uld like to (hank one of the anonymous reviewers for this insight. in turn may reinforce or transform the structur~il configurations over time. For example, we could postulate that more ar less interpretively flexible interactions with technology would be associated with the various organizational forms posited by Mintzberg (1979) .
One might further speculate that if some of the underlying assumptions about the separation of' technology development and use are discarded by organizations because of changing economic conditions vr new strategic initiatives, and as technologies become more amenable tv design and development by users, some af the traditional forms of organizing may be modified. dor example, the role and power of the technostructure in designing and dep(~ying relatively stable technologies for use by workers may change, as workers are given the discretion, knowledge, and resources ta manipulate their technologica. As organizations st~~uggle and learn tv be more Hexible in turbulent times, difí~erent assumptions about and divel•se interactions with technology may both shape ancf be sha~~ed by new forms vi' organizing. Empirical research is needed to determine the forces motivating the conception, development, and use of technologies with different degrees of interpretive Hexihility, and to assess their integration with social practices and organizatione~l forms.
Conclusion
This paper has proposed an alternative theoretical conceptu~ilization of technology which underscores its socio-historical a~ntext, and its duel nature as objective reality and as socially constructed product. 'phis ~aper• details and illustrates a structurational model of technology that can inform our understanding and future invetitigations of hdw technology interacts with organiz~tion5,
The structurational view of technology provides insights into the limitations anti contributions of prior ec~nceptualiz~tion~ cif technology. In particular, we can see how each of the prior traditions was partially correct, but also one-sided. The tcchnological imperative school, perceiving technology to he a biven, objective reality, provides insight into how technology is used, and how, in this use mode, if plays << deterministic role. The strategic choice school, perceiving technt~logy to he a dynamic, human construction, provides insight into how technology is cíevelo~~r~i and interpreted, and how through this c~~nstructíon it reflects scacial interests and motivations. The view of technology as an ~ccasicm for structtu~al change provides insight into ho~v the socio-histat'ical context influences the interaction of humans around the use of a technology.
The structurational model of technology is intended to punctuate key aspects cif the technology phenomenon, ~►ncl suggest typical relationships and interactions sui'rouncJing its development and use. Even tlwugh causal associations n ay be nastulated and investigated, the premises af' the structurational ►rodel caution us against undue determinism. While expected relationships may hold empirically fc~x certain organizations in certain historical and s~ci<~-economic conditiUns, the ever-present ~ibility af actors to alter the cycle ~f develo~~menf, ~~ppropr[ation, institutionalization, and reproduction of technology m~~y undermine any causal expectations. The cmgoing interaction of technology with org~tniz~tio»s must be understood dialectically, as involving reciprocal causation, where the specific institutional context aild the actions of knowledgeable, reflexive humans always mediate the relationship.
This view af technology encourages investigations of the interaction between technology and c~rganizati~ns that seek patterns across certain contexts and certain types of technology, rather than abstract, detei~ministie relationships that transcend setti~ig5, technologies, and intentions. f1s the field study shows, there are strong tendencies within institutionalized practices that constrain and Facilitate certain cicvclopments and deployments of technology. In particular, understanding hew difl~erent conditions influence the cíevelapment, maintenance, and use af mare vr less interpretively flexible technologies would give insight into the limits and opportunities of human choice and organizational design.
